The Problem of Attributes
The Problem of Attributes
The Ambiguity of the Concept of Attribute
This chapter discusses Hegel’s objections to the relation of the attributes to substance. Hegel reduces the attributes to external forms of reflection that have lost all solidarity with substance from which they apparently emerge. The relationship of substance to its attributes is a chronological one; substance exists before its attributes and is greater than them. Meanwhile, Spinoza argues that the concept of attribute specifically eliminates the possibility of such subordination, stating that attributes express the very nature of substance in every possible way. Finally, Hegel interprets the distinction between attributes as a relationship of opposition, reflected through the distinction between thought and extension.
Keywords: Hegel, Spinoza, attributes, substance, thought, philosophical extension
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